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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the Japan-China rivalry and independent foreign policy (IFP) rhetoric of 
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Using both AntConc (concordance program) and conventional 
reading, this study identifies the themes and aspects as to how he used words related to China and 
Japan in his speeches. Data analysis reveals that his rhetoric centered on several themes, such as 
historical relations, brotherly and friendly relations, strategic partnership, China as an economic and 
military superpower, development assistance, and as point of reference, among others. Contrary to 
what Duterte portrays as IFP, the study shows that even after two years into his presidency, nothing 
has really changed in the Philippines. His promise of pursuing an IFP policy has neither taken the form 
of a concrete plan nor materialized as a policy. This paper argues that the ambivalence in Duterte’s 
foreign policy rhetoric is just a strategy to accommodate China’s influence while maintaining his 
nationalist narrative. His IFP rhetoric is just a manifestation of continuing dependency to outside 
powers. No matter how different it initially seemed to be from previous administrations in the way that 
it entertains other powers such as China and Japan apart from the US, it still cannot be considered as 
IFP. 
Keywords: Independent foreign policy, Japan-China rivalry, Philippine foreign policy under Duterte, 
presidential speech analysis, Rodrigo Duterte 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Japan - China competition is commonly studied using the lens of international relations and 
regional competition (see Chu, 2008; De Castro, 2013) which explain how states become “pro-
active” leaders in regional cooperation (see Nabers, 2010; Park, 2013) and look into historical 
narratives on how the rivalry came about (see Calder, 2006). Other analyses recognize that 
leadership dynamics can also depend on how the “leadership aspirants” gain acceptance among 
“potential followers” (Park, 2014) while others ignore perspectives from the less powerful 
countries and see them as mere passive players (Chu, 2008). In the case of the Philippines, a 
large volume of research studies either focus their analyses on how its foreign policy would 
affect rival countries (usually United States, China and Japan) (Morada, 2009) or on the 
regional issue of South China Sea/West Philippine Sea (SCS/WPS) dispute. It seems that a 
more local and historical approach in studying the topic is scarce.  
A particularly interesting lens to view this is how President Rodrigo Roa Duterte portrays 
this competition through an analysis of his presidential speeches. While this article aims to 
analyze the meaning behind the rhetoric, it also tries to picture how Duterte’s foreign policy 
looked like during his first year in office. Anyone interested in International Relations would 
say that Duterte’s foreign policy is realist in approach and perspective but what interests many 
is whether it can be characterized as “bandwagoning” or simply “hedging”.  Murphy (2017, p. 
168) notes that ideal security atmosphere for small states is a “system equilibrium” as it allows 
states to freely “maneuver between great powers”. The goal of hedging is 
to secure as many benefits as possible from as many states as possible. The 
principle indicators of hedging include military strengthening without a 
declared adversary, increased participation in bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning, and the 
simultaneous improvement in relations with the two greatest regional 
powers. (Murphy, 2017, p. 174) 
Based on Murphy’s definition, Duterte’s foreign policy is a form of hedging and in this 
case, it is not only balancing the US and China but also other powers such as Japan. Roy (2005, 
p. 308) posits that the “fear” of Southeast Asian states towards China stems from its 
geographical proximity and historical experience,” China’s “sheer size”, the “longevity of 
Chinese civilization” as well as the fact that there are many wealthy ethnic Chinese in these 
countries. Murphy (2017, p. 175), on the other hand, explains this by saying that Duterte’s 
foreign policy seems to be bandwagoning for “profit” by “seeking Chinese investment” while 
also serving as a “response to threat” by “avoiding conflict”.  
Basically, this paper aims to analyze the speeches of Duterte particularly on how he talks 
about diplomacy and international relations – topics that are far from the immediate needs of 
millions of Filipino people living in poverty. His being a mayor for more than two decades 
with a special focus on domestic policies makes it even more interesting as he seems to lack 
experience in foreign policy (see Castillo, 2017; Heydarian, 2017b).  
2.0 RECENT STUDIES ON RHETORIC IN PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 
Some of the most recent studies on Philippine presidential speeches were conducted by Rubic-
Rocamora (2018), Serquiña (2016), and Quinto (2014). Rubic-Rocamora (2018) selected 30 
speeches and analyzed them in terms of linguistic features such as the use of tenses, points of 
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view (first, second, third person) and related rhetorical strategies. Quinto (2014) on the other 
hand, examined one translated speech, of which he analyzed how the president positions 
various elements such as person, time, space, and social relationships in the deictic field. While 
these authors have valuable contributions in the field, results are more oriented to linguistics 
rather than political analyses and provided very little discussion on how presidential rhetoric is 
related to policies. Serquiña’s (2016, p. 214) brilliant analysis of three State of the Nation 
Addresses (SONAs) and eight occasional speeches focused on what former President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) calls as the “greatest export” of the Philippines, the Overseas 
Filipino Workers. He examined how presidential rhetoric, the phenomenon of migration and 
politics of labels intertwine not only in the rhetoric of GMA but also in terms of policies. 
However, primarily due to the small number of speeches analyzed, none of these saw the 
necessity to use computer-aided technique.  
3.0 JAPAN AND CHINA’S PLACE IN PHILIPPINE HISTORY AND THEIR ROLE IN 
DUTERTE’S “INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY” 
The big power rivalry between Japan and China in the Philippines is a relatively new 
phenomenon. It emerged only when China became the second largest economy in the world 
and started to provide developing countries with cheaper infrastructure projects with low 
interest loans. Consequently, the country became a threat to both US and Japan- US being a 
long-time ally and Japan being the top donor country for the longest time. For several decades, 
no competition existed due to the fact that the Philippines was perceived as a US bastion in the 
Asia Pacific. That is why when Duterte announced his own brand of foreign policy 
(“independent foreign policy”), it was almost certain that it would deviate from the traditional 
set-up of Philippine foreign diplomacy. The new phenomenon both in the rise of China as one 
of the competing economic giants and Duterte’s independent foreign policy (IFP) should be 
understood in a longer and larger historical context of Philippine foreign relations.  
This idea of IFP is also the reason why Duterte cooperates with non-traditional partner 
countries framed under the objective of reducing dependency on the US and strengthening 
relations with China which was not very good during the previous administration due to 
Aquino’s strong anti-China stance in the SCS dispute. Besides, Duterte also seems uncertain 
about the “sincerity and reliability of the United States as an ally” (Baviera, 2016, p. 204). On 
a personal level, this “hatred” of US was attributed by analysts to two incidents: one was 
because of the so-called “Meiring incident” in 2002 which he thought was a “clear violation of 
his mandate as the mayor” and the other one was when he was denied a US visa (Heydarian, 
2017a, p. 232). 
Duterte’s anti-Western rhetoric also came a time when China became more aggressive 
economically and politically after it became the world’s second largest economy. There were 
also some uncertainties regarding the US presidency, the resurgence of populism, among 
others. As a result, Japan and China were considered as important strategic partners of the 
Philippines not only in terms of trade but also in terms of development assistance. Japan 
remains the top donor to the country while China is the top trading partner. This IFP dream 
became evident when he announced the “separation” of the Philippines from the US in his first 
state visit to China which was seen as an outright rejection of the historical ties between the 
two traditional allies (Palatino, 2017) and when he invited Japan’s Prime Minster Shinzo Abe 
into his home and kept on referring to the country as a “friend” and a “brother”. 
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Unlike the Philippine relations with US which generally remains constant, relations with 
China depends on who heads the administration (see Baviera, 2014; De Guzman, 2014). 
Baviera (2014) posits that domestic factors such as political culture, influence of domestic 
interest groups, public opinion, or issues of regime legitimacy contribute to changes in foreign 
policy and Philippines-China relations. In Japan’s case, although the Philippines was one of 
the countries deeply affected by Japanese occupation, it can be said that relations have been 
improving since World War II. Japan became a destination of Overseas Filipino Workers 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s before the country imposed stricter rules in mid-2000s. 
However, on the side of development assistance, it can be said that although Japan is an old 
time provider through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to the Philippines 
since 1974 and that China’s provision of aid would be difficult to determine because of the 
country’s lack of an aid agency, Duterte seems to lean towards the latter. 
Having lived in Mindanao which is very much intertwined with neighboring Malaysia and 
Indonesia, Duterte has a very strong sense of “Asianness” as seen in his speeches. This is 
attested to by his many visits to ASEAN countries. In fact, the only non-Asian countries he 
visited in his first year in office was due to an APEC Summit-related trip to Peru, with a 
stopover in New Zealand in 2016 and Russia in May 2017. In his first year in office, Duterte 
visited China twice. The first one was on the 18th to the 21st of October 2016 upon the 
invitation of President Xi Jinping while the second one was during the Silk Road Summit on 
the 13th to the 14th of May 2017. Japan, on the other hand was visited by Duterte only once 
during his first year in office on 26 October 2016. However, Abe visited Duterte in his Davao 
home in January 2017.  
To further emphasize the importance of Duterte’s official trips in foreign policy, these 
should be viewed alongside other trips by former presidents. The Official Gazette of the 
Philippines listed the US as the country with most frequent trips of the presidents of the 
Philippines after World War II, except Ferdinand Marcos with four visits to Indonesia and 
Corazon Aquino with three trips to Japan. It is important to note that Duterte spent more than 
PhP300 million for his 21 foreign trips in his first year in office. This was a large number in 
terms of quantity and cost especially when compared to the eight trips Aquino had during his 
first year in office (Merez, 2017). Because of this, it can be said that although Duterte was a 
mayor primarily concerned with domestic policies for more than 20 years, he now seems to 
give a lot of attention to foreign policy. 
The historically structured relations between Japan and China in which one country is more 
prosperous than the other has recently been challenged as China became the second largest 
economy and Japan fell into third place (Calder, 2006, p. 129). This led to a more heated rivalry 
between the two countries in Asia. While China is increasingly taking over the traditional 
recipients of Japanese ODA, Japan is also beginning to take extra steps in countering China 
through the SCS/WPS dispute. 
4.0 METHODOLOGY 
This study analyzes the speeches, messages and statements delivered by Duterte himself during 
his first year in office. The corpus consists of a total of 235 speeches from June 30, 2016 to 
May 31, 2017, with an average of 21 speeches delivered per month. These were chosen because 
the materials are carefully planned and have undergone different levels of filters and 
assessment by presidential staff and advisers. Moreover, speeches are also more structured than 
interviews and may provide a closer reflection of state policies.  
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This study aims to provide a glimpse of Duterte’s Japan-China rivalry and independent 
foreign policy rhetoric and narratives. The main reliable source of the texts of Duterte’s 
speeches is the government website (pcoo.gov.ph). The study partly uses AntConc, a free 
concordance program that lists down words used in a corpus and indicates how many times an 
item is repeated. It also provides the context as to how the word was used. Nevertheless, the 
study still relies on conventional reading of the speeches so as not to neglect important details 
that could not be captured by the computer-aided technique being used. 
5.0 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1  Duterte’s China rhetoric  
References to “China” amounted to 610 mentions throughout the whole corpus. His speeches 
on China centered on themes which included: (i) Chinese ancestry, (ii) strategic partnership, 
(iii) US-China rivalry, (iv) China as an economic superpower, (v) source of drugs, (vi) 
SCS/WPS dispute, and (vii) development assistance. Double counting was made whenever a 
word was mentioned with two possible references. This is shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Duterte’s references to China, Chinese and Intsik 
 China Chinese Intsik 
ancestry 2 68 5 
development assistance 79 23 3 
drugs 40 32 6 
engaged in illegal activities 0 4 0 
strategic partnership 26 7 0 
kidnapping 0 9 1 
Russia - China 9 3 1 
brother or friend 12 2 0 
US - China rivalry 32 6 0 
one of the superpowers 14 0 0 
point of reference of example 12 6 0 
SCS 119 5 0 
richest in the Philippines 0 6 0 
as a country 31 5 0 
organization / proper name 1 2 0 
Asian big brother 5 0 0 
military power / capacity 6 3 0 
infrastructure 12 0 0 
ASEAN partner 3 0 0 
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business or investment 39 2 0 
 
Duterte mentioned his “Chinese ancestry” 68 times saying that his grandfather (mother’s 
side) was pure Chinese (five out of 16 times in relation to “Intsik” or its Filipino derogatory 
translation, 68 out of 165 times in relation to “Chinese” and two out of 429 times in relation to 
“China”). Interestingly, 69 out of 610 mentions is more than 11 percent of his total mentions 
of “China” which may lead analysts to think that he is really trying to establish good relations 
with this nation. 
In Duterte’s second State of the Nation Address or SONA, there were four mentions of 
“China” while there was no mention of Japan at all. All the mentions of China revolved around 
the idea of friendship, promised help, and a better future. In all his other speeches, China was 
also portrayed as an economic superpower who can do much more compared to the US, 
I do not need your assistance, challenge —Millennium Challenge, 400 
million? China is going to release to me 50 billion, go home, I do not need 
your aid.…I’ve been to China, said China, “we will give you something like 
15 billion.  
(Speech delivered during the Christmas Townhall 
with the President, December 19, 2016, 
Malacañan Palace)  
Duterte also sells the idea that China “understands [the country’s] plight as an agricultural 
country” and the strongest point would be to sell products such as bananas and pineapples 
which China promised to import regardless of quality. In October 2016, China lifted ban on the 
importation of bananas from the Philippines (Department of Trade and Industry, 2017).  In one 
of Duterte’s speeches, he said that, 
Our economy has improved after I went to China. I talked there. They were 
not buying our bananas or anything until I asked them what’s wrong with 
the bananas, what’s wrong with our importations. They answered well, it’s 
not about the quality, but they’re talking about geopolitics. [inaudible] they 
have decided not to…. I did not come here to ask for anything. I am not 
asking anything. All I was asking was what went wrong with the products. 
So the bananas: down, nobody would also buy the pineapples.  
(Official translation of the speech in Taglish 
delivered during the Labor Day celebration,  
May 1, 2017, Davao City) 
Interestingly, pineapple was mentioned 40 times while banana (“saging” in Filipino) was 
mentioned 42 times (33 banana; 9 “saging”). What’s interesting here is that pineapple was 
mentioned the same number of times as “nationalism,” “governance,” and “values.” In this 
diplomacy of pineapples and bananas, Duterte plays the role of a president who sells the idea 
of mutual benefit in a relationship that is clearly very unequal right from the very start. In 
another speech, he said, 
But you know, I have yet to hear Americans going to my office for the 23 
years that I’ve been mayor, expressing good intentions and about going to 
business that would help the food and everything. They go there not really 
for the basics, importation of fruits and everything just what China is doing. 
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But they go for the mining and all of these things that are really very 
detrimental to your country.  
(Speech delivered during the Philippines-China 
Trade and Investment Forum on October 20,  
2016, Beijing, PRC) 
5.2 Duterte’s Japan rhetoric 
“Japan” was mentioned 71 times in the corpus, “Japanese” was mentioned 18 times while the 
Filipino translation “Hapon” was mentioned once, with a total of 90 references to Japan. 
Duterte’s Japan rhetoric revolves around the following: (i) historical references, (ii) Japan as a 
strategic partner, (iii) Japan as provider of development assistance particularly infrastructure, 
(iv) Japan as point of reference or example and (iv) Japan as a brother and a friend. Again, 
double counting was done whenever a word was mentioned with two possible references. This 
is shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. Duterte’s references to Japan, Japanese and Hapon 
 
Japan 
(mentions) 
Japanese (mentions) Hapon (mentions) 
historical 0 6 1 
development 
assistance 
30 7 0 
as a country/ nation 5 2 0 
drugs 0 1 0 
strategic partnership 20 1 0 
point of reference of 
example 
7 1 0 
brother or friend 11 0 0 
one of the partner / 
Asian countries 
4 0 0 
 
An example of historical references to Japan is the topic of the Japanese Occupation which 
was mentioned five times. Japan as a strategic partner rhetoric was mentioned 20 times and 
usually focused on trade relations, and was usually mentioned alongside ASEAN, and other 
countries such as China, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, among others. Japan as a 
provider of development assistance was mentioned most frequently at 30 times. The other 
mentions are as a “country” or “Asian country” which occurred 11 times, as a point of reference 
or example which was mentioned seven times and as inventor of “drugs” which was mentioned 
once. 
Although Japan was mentioned only a few times compared to China or the United States 
or even Russia, most are positive references such as Japan as one of the “friendly neighbors” 
and even as a “brother”. Besides, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo was the only head of state 
able to visit Duterte in his Davao home in 2017.  
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In a mixture of Filipino and English, he said: 
Mas komportable ako dito sa Japan and even China…Alam mo ang pinaka-
maano sa atin is ang Japan. Japan talaga ang pinakamalaking tulong 
natin..Grabe ang tulong nila… I don’t know but Japan is very attached to 
us. And to the fact that, they are really so very kind. Wala akong ma-ano sa 
Japanese people except na, so in return, kaya tayong mga Filipino pag 
napunta sila doon, gusto ko nga iyang protektado sila.  
Translation:  
I am more comfortable in Japan and even China. Japan is the country 
which is most helpful to us... they really help us a lot... I don’t know but 
Japan is very attached to us. And to the fact that, they are really so very 
kind. I can’t do anything for the Japanese people except that when they 
come to the Philippines, I want them protected. 
(Speech delivered during a get together with the 
Filipino community in Japan on October 25, 2016) 
5.3 The Infrastructure narrative and its role in Dutertenomics  
A common narrative in Duterte’s speeches is the topic of infrastructure which was dubbed by 
his economic staff as “Dutertenomics”. According to the National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA) (2016), there will be a budget increase for public infrastructure from 5.32 
percent of GDP in 2017 to around 7.45 percent of GDP by 2022. This represents an average 
6.8 percent of GDP with a total funding requirement of about PhP8.44 trillion ($168 billion) 
over the medium term. This is a drastic change compared to 2.9 percent from 2010 to 2016. 
Even the Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 (2016) highlights the importance of 
intensifying infrastructure spending with the promise of making the Philippines a middle 
income country in the next few decades. But just like other developing countries which lack 
internal funds to support such grand projects, 48 out of the 75 flagship projects in the NEDA 
list will be funded by foreign debt through ODA. In spite of this, Duterte consistently claims 
that the public will not be indebted by these infrastructure projects.  
While the earlier part of China’s economic development in the 2000s shows 
complementarity with Japan (Kwan, 2002), the current era can no longer be considered as such. 
It is now better framed in terms of competition rather than complementarity. As Padilla (2017) 
argues, the fact that both countries are backing Duterte’s “Build, Build, Build” program is 
“symptomatic” of how the two economic powers see “development cooperation” as one of the 
key arenas of their competition in the region. The capacity of infrastructure projects to foster 
soft power and somehow shape and influence countries were already proven by many studies 
in Asia and even in Africa. Duterte frames China’s loans in terms of “altruism and generosity” 
while the actual interests and other conditionalities accruing from these loans are disregarded 
(Padilla, 2017).  
Menocal, Denney, and Geddes (2011) argue that as the donor marketplace becomes more 
crowded, it becomes important for donor countries to identify their distinctiveness. Japan does 
this by stressing that its aid is different from China especially in terms of quality (Trinidad, 
2017, p. 24). China’s strategy on the other hand is to provide recipient countries with projects 
that they need in a faster manner that supposedly adheres to the value of non-interference in 
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local affairs. However, Chinese loans are more expensive at two to three percent interest rate 
compared to Japan with only .25 to .75 percent interest. The problem however is that Japanese 
loans are usually processed very slowly (Cigaral, 2018). Interestingly, China started out as a 
cheaper alternative to Northern donors over the last decades. Yet, at present, traditional donors 
are portraying themselves as alternative to China’s aid only with better quality. Duterte makes 
this competition very obvious in his speeches. He makes it clear at this point that he just wants 
infrastructure projects regardless of the source of loans.  
5.4 The Independent Foreign Policy (IFP) narrative  
Duterte’s IFP narrative revolves around the idea of partnership with other sovereign countries 
in Southeast Asia and beyond. Duterte seems to constantly shift between an anti-American IFP 
and one that pluralizes Philippine relations with traditional partners like US and Japan towards 
forming alliances with countries like China. An obvious example of this is the frequent 
appearance in his speeches not only of China, Japan, and US but also of Russia with 75 counts, 
Malaysia with 81 counts, and Indonesia with 111 counts. His new foreign policy became 
official on 30 September 2016 in Davao City immediately after his Vietnam trip on 28 to 29 
September 2016. According to Duterte, 
My official visit to Vietnam demonstrated our adherence to an independent 
foreign policy which seeks cooperation and collaboration with friendly 
nations on the basis of sovereign equality, non-interference, and the mutual 
respect to protect our national interests.  
(Statement following Duterte’s official visit to  
Vietnam, September 30, 2016, Davao City) 
“Independent foreign policy” was only mentioned 13 times in all of his speeches during his 
first year in office. Duterte claims that his “new foreign policy” will be neutral and frequently 
repeated his problem with Philippine foreign policy which has always been pro-US. 
Nevertheless, Duterte continues to abide by the old relations particularly the US-RP Pact. 
...We are a sovereign power and I think that we should chart our own. 
Although, we cannot enter into any military alliance with any other country 
because of the RP-US Pact, which was signed by our forefathers many 
years ago. Until now, it is enforced so it would be an incongruity for us to 
be joining alliances militarily with other countries.  
(Speech delivered during the People’s Day 
celebration, March 29, 2017, Mindoro) 
Duterte’s anti-US rhetoric was particularly obvious during the Obama presidency. Webb 
(2017, p. 128) posits that although Duterte is not the first president who popularized the theme 
on the “hypocrisy of American intervention of the Philippines”, his “successful mobilization 
of a state-led nationalist discourse” demonstrates that the legacy of American intervention 
continues to haunt the Filipinos up to this day. In the corpus of his speeches, Duterte mentioned 
“China-US rivalry” 36 times out of the 429 times he used the word “China”. As De Castro 
(2017, p. 17) points out, Duterte’s ambition of “appeasing China at the expense of the 
Philippine-US alliance” became evident during Balikatan in 2017 when he “scaled down” and 
“refocused” exercises into those relating to humanitarian assistance and disaster and counter-
terrorism compared with the usual high-profile live-fire components. Duterte formally 
announced his supposed “total separation” from the US and his pivot to China in a speech 
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during the Philippines-China Trade and Investment Forum held in Beijing on 20 October 2016, 
as shown below.  
So with that, I, in this venue, your honors, in this venue, I announce my 
separation from the United States; (applause) both in military, not with the 
social rehabilitation, both the military but economics also…Because in the 
East ASEAN Affairs, Cambodia could not be theirs, 100 per cent, it is an 
ally of China. Laos? It is always an ally of China. Vietnam? Same thing. 
Widodo of Indonesia is neutral. Duterte of the Philippines is veering 
towards China, (applause) because China has the character of an Oriental. 
(applause) It does not go around insulting people, insisting on policies to 
follow them and trying to control the money of the world through the IMF 
and the World Bank. (applause) Dito [Here], Asian Development Bank. 
He always threatens to cut ties with the US but does not really act on it. For instance, 
nothing happened when Lorenzana declared that Duterte wants to halt the 28 Philippine-US 
military exercises carried out each year (“Lorenzana: aid from the US,” 2016). Besides, despite 
Duterte’s 10 utterances about the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty which was signed in 
1951, he consistently claims that he is powerless to do it. 
Duterte delivered four speeches in front of foreign audiences in his first two visits to China 
and Japan. There were six mentions of “China” in his Japan visits and six mentions of “Japan” 
in his China visits. He mentioned “China” in his visits to Japan in the context of promising to 
work closely with Japan on the issue of SCS, reassuring the Japanese that his visits to China 
were purely economic, and in statements on the matter of security cooperation. In the six 
mentions of “Japan” in his China trips, half pertains to China’s competition with Japan and 
other Asian countries while the other half pertains to the money/aid coming from Japan. It is 
noticeable in these speeches that Duterte is trying hard to please China while playing safe when 
dealing with Japan. Japan is like an older friend whom he can be honest with but China is a 
newer friend who needs to be pleased. 
Despite the increasing and diversifying security partnerships with China, Russia, and Japan, 
the US still remains the Philippines’ most important defense partner. Galang (2017), on the 
other hand, argues that Duterte’s foreign policy should be understood in the context of a 
“complex international environment” wherein an “unambiguous alignment or identification 
with one power” is considered as a “luxury which most states can no longer afford”. Chito Sta. 
Romana, the Ambassador of the Philippines to China, identified three elements of Duterte’s 
IFP (Galang, 2017). First, Duterte’s IFP lessens Manila’s dependence on Washington while 
maintaining the historic alliance with the United States. Second, it also improves relations with 
China particularly economic ties while reducing the tensions caused by the South China Sea 
dispute. Third, it also improves relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, Japan, 
and India while maintaining the “centrality of ASEAN”.  
 
Another obvious component of Duterte’s narrative is that China is a big country that the 
Philippines should avoid having conflict with: “China is rich and it can gobble up a lot of 
territory” (Speech during the 7th anniversary of the Federalismo Alyansa ng Bayan, December 
8, 2016). In the same speech, Duterte advised that since the Philippines cannot compete with 
China, it can have greater benefits “if [the country] can just have a settlement with them despite 
the arbitral judgment”. The fact this was mentioned several times throughout the corpus may 
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lead to the conclusion that Duterte’s IFP is partnered with the narrative of powerlessness. 
Whenever the SCS/WPS dispute is mentioned, he consistently warns of a massacre that could 
inevitably happen due to the superior military capability of China and the high probability of 
the Philippines becoming a battleground. In the 124 mentions of the SCS dispute, 50 of these 
fall within the powerlessness narrative and thus accounts for about 40.3 percent.  
A study by the Pew Research Center in 2017 says that compared to the US, China is 
perceived more positively with a median of 47 percent that have a favorable opinion and 37 
percent unfavorable (Wike, Poushter, Silver, & Bishop, 2017). As for the Philippines, the same 
study says that notwithstanding the efforts by Duterte to establish closer relations with China, 
the attitude of the Filipinos towards the country is still the same as it was in 2015. However, it 
is noticeable how their awareness of China as the world’s leading economy increased from 14 
percent in 2015 to 25 percent in 2017 (Poushter & Bishop, 2017). Because of this, perhaps 
more Filipinos view the country as a threat at 47 percent compared to the US at 25 percent 
(Poushter & Bishop, 2017, p. 3). Overall, the Filipinos are still “more favourable” to the US at 
78 percent as compared with China at 55 percent (Poushter & Bishop, 2017, p. 7). It is also 
interesting how the study found that the Filipinos with favourable view of Duterte rated China 
positively at 57 percent compared to those who viewed him unfavourably at 40 percent 
(Poushter & Bishop, 2017, p. 7). However, a Pulse Asia Survey reveals that 20 percent of 
Filipinos have “a great deal of trust” for Japan while 54 percent answered “a fair amount of 
trust”. As for China, 37 percent says they have “a great deal of trust” while 5 percent says they 
have “a fair amount of trust”. The distrust level is high at 35 percent for “not too much trust” 
and 28 for “no trust at all”. There is an increase in the number of Filipinos with “no trust at all” 
in China as compared to 22 percent in December 2016. 
With just over a year in office, Duterte already visited China and Japan twice. In his six 
years in office, Benigno Aquino III visited China only twice, Japan six times and the US seven 
times. A “new chapter” in the relationship between the Philippines and China was mentioned 
several times in Duterte’s speeches. However, the pattern of visits wherein it is always Duterte 
who goes to China can be likened to how China perceived itself as the Middle Kingdom in the 
past and how tributaries were the ones who paid visits. For instance, after Duterte’s visit to 
China, he said that Philippine relations with China have “improved dramatically” with Filipino 
fishermen being able to return and fish in the Scarborough Shoal thanks to China’s goodwill. 
As Duterte puts it, 
We’re doing well. I’m sure I was correct in going to China and making 
friends with them. I did not commit a mistake. I said that if you see things 
that was sprucing up now, it’s because of our friendship with China.  
(Speech delivered during the inauguration of  
Metro Manila Crisis Monitoring & Management  
Center, April 4, 2017, Makati) 
Unlike Aquino who did not have very good relations with China and who kept mentioning 
former President GMA in all his speeches, Duterte rarely mentions Aquino except for saying 
that his tactics weren’t any good,  
Nung umakyat si Aquino tinabla niya so kaya galit ang China. Galit talaga 
sa kanya.  
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Translation: 
When Aquino came to power, he stalemated them so China got angry. They 
are really angry at him.  
(Speech delivered during the inauguration  
of the Filinvest Development  
Corporation’s Misamis Power Plant,  
September 22, 2016, Misamis Oriental). 
Duterte also exploited the idea of Asia for Asians: 
I also told him that, you know, we are in Asia, far from the maddening 
crowd of Europe, it’s too far away the Western powers should be worrying 
about us. Sabi ko, ang swerte natin nandito sa Asia [I said, we are lucky 
that we are here in Asia] and since China is the leading industrial power, 
we’ll have to ally with them in trade and commerce and eventually improve 
on the bilateral relations and come out with a vibrant economy  
(Speech delivered during an event  
organized by Department of Agriculture,  
March 7, 2017, Malacañan Palace) 
Unlike the US - China dichotomy throughout his speeches, China and Japan are not 
portrayed as rivals by Duterte. He refers to them as Asian brother nations, along with the other 
countries in the region. But whenever he speaks about China and the US, there is always a 
contrast which is usually antagonistic.  
I do not expect United States to die for us so we will just have to navigate 
our way around here.  
(Speech delivered during the  
inauguration of the Filinvest  
Development Corporation’s Misamis  
Power Plant, September 22, 2016,  
Misamis Oriental) 
[If] I have to face China, Russia, and United States, then Philippines on 
one side and they can ask questions. Maybe, I’ll just navigate into 
something like: I am not prepared to talk to the United States at this time. 
I am not ready to, I said, to exchange barbs there with China. I don’t know.  
(Speech during the inauguration of  
Davao International Container Terminal,  
September 2, 2016) 
His downplaying of territorial disputes with China and such acts as removing a memorial 
for comfort women for Japan for the sake of receiving infrastructure projects says something 
about the priorities of his administration.  
The number of times he mentioned the current heads of state in China, Japan, Russia, and 
US also presents an interesting point. “Trump” was mentioned 61 times even though he only 
became president six months after Duterte assumed office, “Putin” 38 times, “Xi Jinping” 33 
times and “Abe” 18 times. Almost all mentions were in a non-antagonistic light especially 
when compared to how he mentioned “Obama” with 118 which were all negative (“Obama, go 
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to hell”). Interestingly, in the 2017 study of the Pew Research Center, it was found that although 
“Filipinos have much less trust in Trump than they did in Obama,” he still has the “highest 
confidence ratings” in the Philippines (Poushter & Bishop, 2017, p. 8). 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
Duterte’s inclination towards China should be situated in the long history of Philippine foreign 
policy which has always been pro-US. While it apparently seeks to diversify alliances with 
non-traditional alliances such as China, it cannot be considered as implying a “separation” from 
the US.  
Overall, Duterte’s IFP rhetoric is a manifestation of continuing dependency to outside 
powers. No matter how different it initially seemed to be from previous administrations in the 
way that it entertains other powers such as China and Japan apart from the US, it still cannot 
be considered as IFP in the proper sense of the concept. The politics of distancing from some 
powers and accommodation to others are actually narratives of powerlessness and helplessness 
hiding under the mask of what is ostensibly an IFP. This “new” narrative highlights how 
diversifying partnership with China, Japan, and other developed countries will benefit the 
Filipinos but shies away from informing the people about the possible negative consequences 
of the deals with these countries. 
In reality, the Philippines is importing more from these countries than exporting to them. 
Data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (2017) shows that Philippine imports from China 
increased by 30.5 percent from $1.2 billion in 2016 to $1.75 billion in 2017, making China the 
country’s largest source of the country’s imports. Meanwhile, Japan placed as the second 
largest exporter to the Philippines with $926.18 million accounting for a 5 percent increase 
from last year. The balance of trade in goods between the Philippines and China is $900.34 
million while the balance of trade with Japan is $54.82 million. It is obvious that even after 
two years into his presidency, nothing has really changed in the Philippines. His promise of 
pursuing an IFP in his speeches has neither taken the form of a concrete plan nor materialized 
as a policy.   
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